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Building a Better Baby Business 
Debora Spar* & Anna M.  Harrington** 
Thirty years ago, Louise Brown’s 1978 birth1 ushered in a 
new era of reproductive technology.  The first baby born via in 
vitro fertilization (“IVF”), mixing eggs and sperm in a test tube, 
promised hope to millions desperate to conceive.  Yet along 
with the promise came dilemmas about just how far one should 
go to have a child.  Heather Higgins, for example, lost track of 
the number of IVF cycles she had undergone at twenty-eight 
years of age and twenty-one cycles.2  Roberta Kraft was 
$38,700 in debt after spending everything she had and 
borrowing more trying to get pregnant.3  Nkem Chukwu gave 
birth to the world’s first octuplets in 1998 as a result of fertility 
drugs,4 though the fifth and smallest died.5  Pregnant fifty-one-
year-old Sophia hoped to join a hundred other women who had 
become mothers over the age of fifty, including Arceli Keh, the 
oldest reported woman to give birth to a child at age sixty-
three.6  Samantha Carolan received $7,000 to donate her eggs 
the first time at age twenty-three, and $8,000 the second time, 
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 1. First ‘Test Tube Baby’ Born, BBC NEWS, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/25/newsid_2499000/24994
11.stm (last visited Sept.  26, 2008). 
 2. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, For the Infertile, a High-Tech Treadmill, N.Y.  
TIMES, Dec.  14, 1997, § 1, at 36. 
 3. Esther B.  Fein, Calling Infertility a Disease, Couples Battle with 
Insurers, N.Y.  TIMES, Feb.  22, 1998, § 1, at 1. 
 4. See Americas Octuplet Baby Dies, BBC NEWS, Dec.  27, 1998, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/243155.stm. 
 5. Lawrence K.  Altman, Smallest Octuplet Dies; Others Remain Critical, 
N.Y.  TIMES, Dec.  28, 1998, at A18. 
 6. Lisa Belkin, Pregnant with Complications, N.Y.  TIMES, Oct.  26, 1997, 
§ 6 (Magazine), at 33–36. 
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using the money to pay off her student loans.7  She planned to 
donate again.8  Geraldine Wesolowski, age fifty-three, gave 
birth to her child and grandchild, conceived from her son’s 
sperm and his infertile wife’s eggs.9  Augusta Roman was told 
by a Texas court that her three frozen embryos, created with 
her ex-husband Randy, would have to be destroyed.10  Danielle 
Pagano, age sixteen, desperate to know her origins, placed an 
advertisement on Donor Sibling Registry, a website that 
facilitates connections between the parents and offspring of 
assisted reproduction: “Hello, I’m Your Sister.  Our Father Is 
Donor 150.”11 
These are all true stories, plucked from dozens like them 
that litter the pages of newspapers, magazines, and books.   
They are all stories about the modern marvels of reproductive 
technology, but also, more subtly, about the failure to establish 
rules governing what has become a sizeable industry in the 
United States and abroad.  This article attempts to describe 
how lawmakers can fill that gap to ensure quality and equity in 
the reproductive technology industry.  It argues for curbing the 
excesses and unfairness inherent in a market that offers some 
people their only hope of a genetically related child.  This 
article covers four broad topics: a survey of the market for 
assisted reproduction, or what is termed “the baby business;”12 
an overview of the problems emanating from this market; an 
argument about the relative lack of regulation in this area; and 
an examination of various regulatory and public policy 
approaches that could lead to a substantially better baby 
business. 
I. THE MARKET FOR ASSISTED REPRODUCTION: THE 
                                                          
 7. Roni Caryn Rabin, As Demand for Donor Eggs Soars, High Prices Stir 
Ethical Concerns, N.Y.  TIMES, May 15, 2007, at F6. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See Lindsey Gruson, When ‘Mom’ and ‘Grandma’ are One and the 
Same, N.Y.  TIMES, Feb.  16, 1993, at B1. 
 10. Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 54–55 (Tex.  App.  2006) (upholding 
an agreement between a couple providing for discarding their unused embryos 
in the event of a divorce); see also Court Won’t Hear Battle Over Embryos, N.Y.  
TIMES (late edition), Aug.  26, 2007, at A20. 
 11. Amy Harmon, Hello, I’m Your Sister.  Our Father is Donor 150., N.Y.  
TIMES, Nov.  20, 2005, § 1, at 1. 
 12. See generally DEBORA L.  SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, 
SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION (2006) 
(describing how assisted reproduction has become a market driven industry). 
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“BABY BUSINESS” 
Assisted reproductive technology (“ART”) is one of the few 
markets in the world in which products and services are 
regularly exchanged for money—often very large amounts of 
money—where buyers and sellers on both sides of the exchange 
remain loath to acknowledge that they are engaged in a 
commercial transaction.13  Such reluctance is understandable.   
First, there is an institutional taboo against recognizing the 
commercial nature of the baby business.  Despite the 
flourishing market we describe below, the sale of reproductive 
components is technically forbidden in some states and frowned 
upon by professional organizations.14  Second, on a more 
personal and compelling level, most babies are clearly 
“produced” outside the market—in the bedroom, for free, a 
product of love and not money.  It is only for a small number of 
would-be producers that babies cost money.15  Those who 
venture into the baby business, therefore, have good reason not 
to want to acknowledge the commercial side of their action: 
they, unlike most of their peers, cannot or choose not to produce 
a baby for free.  Yet regardless of the language used or 
preferred, employing ART involves both commercial 
                                                          
 13. See id.  at xiv; Claudia Dreifus, An Economist Examines the Business 
of Fertility: A Conversation with Debora Spar, N.Y.  TIMES, Feb.  28, 2006, at 
F5. 
 14. E.g., IND.  CODE ANN.  § 35-46-5-3 (LexisNexis Supp.  2008) (making it 
a Class C Felony when a person “knowingly or intentionally purchases or sells 
a human ovum, zygote, embryo, or fetus,” but providing exceptions for 
reimbursement for lost earnings, travel expenses, medical or hospital 
expenses, as well as recovery time compensation of up to $3,000 for IVF, 
gamete intrafallopian transfer, or zygote intrafallopian transfer); LA.  REV.  
STAT.  ANN.  § 9:122 (2008) (“The sale of a human ovum, fertilized human 
ovum, or human embryo is expressly prohibited.”); see Ethics Committee of the 
American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Financial Compensation of 
Oocyte Donors, 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 305, 306 (2007)  [hereinafter ASRM 
Guidelines for Oocyte Donor Compensation]: 
As the Ethics Committee explains: Another ethical concern is that 
payment for oocytes implies that they are property or commodities, 
and thus devalues human life.  Many people believe that payment to 
individuals for reproductive and other tissues is inconsistent with 
maintaining important values related to respect for human life and 
dignity.  This view is reflected in state and federal laws prohibiting 
direct payment to individuals providing organs and tissues for 
transplantation. 
See generally NAT’L CONF.  OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STEM CELL RESEARCH 
(2008), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/embfet.htm 
(summarizing state laws regarding the use of human eggs and embryos). 
 15. See SPAR, supra note 12, at 1. 
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transactions and social effects.  If we are to govern these 
transactions and effects as well as we should, we need to 
acknowledge that the market exists and understand how it 
works. 
A. THE DEMAND SIDE 
Currently, the demand side of the baby business comprises 
a wide variety of people, including infertile couples 
(approximately 15% of women and 10-15% of men),16 same sex 
couples, genetically-at-risk couples or individuals,17 single 
parents, gender selectors,18 and fertile adopters.   Interestingly, 
demand has remained high despite high costs19 and is likely 
responsible for pushing prices even higher.20  In economic 
terms, demand can be considered relatively inelastic because 
many people determined to have a child who is genetically 
related to them are willing to pay whatever it takes (or 
whatever they can) to conceive.21  This is often true even if the 
patient knows he or she has a low chance of success.22  Indeed, 
patients are frequently willing to pay nearly $30,000 for a 10% 
                                                          
 16. See, e.g., id.  at 235 n.1; Anjani Chandra & Elizabeth Hervey Stephen, 
Impaired Fecundity in the United States: 1982-1995, 30 FAM.  PLAN.  PERSP.  
34, 36 (1998); see also CTRS.  FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, AM.  
SOC’Y FOR REPROD.  MED.  & SOC’Y FOR ASSISTED REPROD.  TECH., 2005 
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL SUMMARY 
AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 31 (2007), 
http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2005/508PDF/2005ART508.pdf  [hereinafter 2005 
ART REPORT] (describing different causes of infertility among people using 
reproductive technologies). 
 17. See Embryonic Genetic Testing Is Boosting IVF Pregnancies, BIO-
MED., Nov.  11, 2005, http://www.bio-medicine.org/medicine-news/Embryonic-
Genetic-Testing-Is-Boosting-IVF-Pregnancies-5598-1/ (describing  reasons why 
genetically-at-risk couples may use ART to avoid passing on a genetic 
abnormality or disease to their children). 
 18. See The Ethics Comm.  of the Am.  Soc’y of Reprod.  Med., Sex 
Selection and Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 72 FERTILITY & STERILITY 
595, 595 (1999) (explaining the ART methods that may be used to preselect the 
gender of  a child). 
 19. See Debora Spar & Anna Harrington, Selling Stem Cell Science: How 
Markets Drive the Law Along the Technological Frontier, 33 AM.  J.L.  & MED.  
541, 553 (2007). 
 20. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 7, at F6 (indicating the high demand for 
donor eggs has pushed prices up). 
 21. See SPAR, supra note 12, at 4. 
 22. See Judith F.  Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea 
or Paper Tiger?, 34 HOUS.  L.  REV.  609, 629–31 (1997). 
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chance of having a baby.23 
In the future, demand is only likely to grow as more and 
more women postpone childbearing to have careers24 and 
increasing numbers of individuals defy traditional norms of 
child-rearing by opting to have children alone or with same-sex 
partners.25  Others will turn to reproductive technologies to 
avoid passing on genetic abnormalities or disease to their 
offspring,26 or even to choose their children’s gender.27 
B. THE SUPPLY SIDE 
Meanwhile, the supply side is also growing apace, 
generating an increasingly high-tech sector where highly-
trained physicians and laboratory personnel work in state-of-
the-art clinics.  The core technology in this area, IVF, involves 
using hormones to induce ovulation in a woman, taking the 
eggs produced and combining them with a man’s sperm in a 
Petri dish, allowing them to grow for a few days, and then 
implanting the resulting embryos in the woman’s uterus.   
Similar to IVF, but used much less frequently, are gamete 
intrafallopian transfer (“GIFT”) and zygote intrafallopian 
transfer (“ZIFT”), which involve, respectively, placing the eggs 
and sperm directly in the fallopian tubes and putting a zygote 
(early stage embryo) into the fallopian tubes.28 
Intracytoplasmic sperm injection (“ICSI”), meanwhile, 
                                                          
 23. Melinda B.  Henne et al., The Combined Effect of Age and Basal 
Follicle-Stimulating Hormone on the Cost of a 
Live Birth at Assisted Reproductive Technology, 89 FERTILITY & STERILITY 
104, 107 (2008). 
 24. See Linda J.  Heffner, Advanced Maternal Age—How Old is Too Old? 
351 NEW ENG.  J.  MED.  1927, 1927 (2004).  Heffner explains: 
The past decade has seen a remarkable shift in the demographics of 
childbearing in the United States.  The number of first births per 
1000 women 35 to 39 years of age increased by 36 percent between 
1991 and 2001, and the rate among women 40 to 44 years of age 
leaped by a remarkable 70 percent.  In 2002, 263 births were reported 
in women between 50 and 54 years of age. 
 25. See Linda Villarosa, Once-Invisible Sperm Donors Get to Meet the 
Family, N.Y.  TIMES, May 21, 2002, at F5 (indicating that single mothers and 
lesbians are a growing clientele at sperm banks). 
 26. See Embryonic Genetic Testing Is Boosting IVF Pregnancies, supra 
note 17. 
 27. See Denise Grady, Girl or Boy? As Fertility Technology Advances, So 
Does an Ethical Debate, N.Y.  TIMES, Feb.  6, 2007, at F5. 
 28. 2005 ART REPORT, supra note 16, at 39 (describing that GIFT and 
ZIFT are used infrequently, comprising 0.1% and 0.2% of ART procedures 
respectively). 
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which was developed as a treatment for male infertility, 
involves the direct insertion of an individual sperm into the 
ovum.  First used successfully in Belgium in 1992, ICSI today 
accounts for 60% of IVF procedures and is increasingly used 
even when there is no male-factor infertility.29 
Other related technologies have increased the options 
available on the supply side, including cryopreservation (egg or 
embryo freezing), egg donation, and surrogacy.30  In 2005, 
frozen non-donor embryos comprised 15.3 percent, or 20,657, of 
the ART cycles performed in the United States, while frozen 
donor embryos accounted for 4.1 percent, or 5,541, of the 
cycles.31  Donor eggs were used in 12 percent of all cycles—
mostly, we can presume, for older women whose own eggs were 
less healthy.32  Surrogacy, by contrast, which was used in only 
one percent of ART cycles in 2005,33 is a method preferred by 
women who can produce eggs but not carry a pregnancy to term 
and by gay men who want to have a genetically related child.   
Finally, in embryo adoption, a slightly less expensive option, 
couples donate leftover embryos to other infertile couples.34 
C. THE MARKET 
When one combines the supply side, which is being driven 
largely though not entirely by technological developments, with 
the demand side, which has arguably existed since time 
immemorial, the result is a market.35  In ten years, from 1996 
to 2005, the number of ART cycles performed in the United 
States more than doubled, as did the number of babies born 
from the process.36  Figures from 2005 indicate that there were 
134,260 cycles of IVF37 in that year with an average cost of 
$12,400 for one IVF cycle and 38,910 live births that resulted 
from IVF.38  In addition, Americans spent over $80 million on 
                                                          
 29. See id.  at 39–41. 
 30. See id.  at 54. 
 31. See id.  at 14. 
 32. See id.  at 56. 
 33. See id.  at 52. 
 34. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Some See New Route to Adoption in Clinics 
Full of Frozen Embryos, N.Y.  TIMES, Feb.  25, 2001, § 1, at 1. 
 35. See generally SPAR, supra note 12, at 1–30. 
 36. 2005 ART REPORT, supra note 16, at 61. 
 37. See id.  at 12. 
 38. See id.; American Society of Reproductive Medicine, Frequently Asked 
Questions about Infertility, http://www.asrm.org/Patients/faqs.html#Q6 (last 
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16,161 transfers of donor eggs,39 at an average cost of $3,000 to 
$5,000 per “harvest.”40  Some small portion of these eggs—
known colloquially as “Ivy League” or “designer” eggs—fetched 
in the range of $25,000 to $50,000.41  Sperm, by contrast, 
generally sold for $200–$300.42 
Adding these figures together to estimate the total market 
size is difficult.  However, if the figures for 2005 showing IVF 
averaging roughly $12,400 per cycle hold true, the arithmetic 
suggests that assisted reproduction in the United States is at 
least a $1.7 billion market before even considering sperm sales, 
high-end eggs, legal fees, surrogacy, or adoption.  Admittedly, 
this is not a huge market.   Global revenues for bottled water, 
by way of comparison, are $100 billion,43 with nearly $15 billion 
in the United States alone in 2006.44  However, the baby 
market is still a very real market and most certainly a 
commercial enterprise.  Furthermore, it is a unique and 
important market because of what is being bought and sold: the 
promise of a child. 
                                                          
visited Oct.  31, 2008); see also Henne et al., supra note 23, at 106 (indicating 
that the cost of a fresh cycle in the U.S.  in 2005 was between $10,803 and 
$15,317); Mary Duenwald, After 25 Years, New Ideas in the Prenatal Test 
Tube, N.Y.  TIMES, July 15, 2003, at F5 (estimating IVF costs between $10,000 
and $15,000 per cycle). 
 39. 2005 ART REPORT, supra note 16, at 56 (arriving at the $80 million 
figure for spending on donor eggs by multiplying the number of donor egg 
cycles by an estimated average cost of $5,000 per egg). 
 40. See Sharon N.  Covington & William E.  Gibbons, What is Happening 
to the Price of Eggs?, 87 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1001, 1002 (2007) (stating that 
the average compensation of egg donors, based on a survey of clinics, was 
$4,216, ranging from a low of $1,500 to a high of $15,000); Carlene Hempel, 
Golden Eggs, BOSTON GLOBE MAG., Jun.  25, 2006, at 19 (stating that some 
egg donors receive $5,000 for their first donation); see also ASRM Guidelines 
for Oocyte Donor Compensation, supra note 14, at 308 (recommending 
compensation between $5,000 and $10,000). 
 41. See Covington & Gibbons, supra note 40, at 1001; Gina Kolata, 
$50,000 Offered to Tall, Smart Egg Donor, N.Y.  TIMES, Mar.  3, 1999, at A10; 
see also Dreifus, supra note 13, at F5. 
 42. SPAR, supra note 12, at 37. 
 43. EMILY ARNOLD & JANET LARSEN, EARTH POLICY INST., BOTTLED 
Water: Pouring Resources Down the Drain (2006), http://www.earth-
policy.org/Updates/2006/Update51.htm; see also Tom Standage, Op-Ed., Take 
it Straight from the Tap, L.A.  TIMES, Aug.  7, 2007, at A15. 
 44. Charles Fishman, Message in a Bottle, FAST COMPANY MAG.  (2007), 
available at http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/117/features-message-in-
a-bottle.html; see also Allison Van Dusen, Health in a Bottle?, FORBES, Apr.  
30, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/health/2007/04/28/water-health-bottled-
forbeslife-cx_avd_0430bottled.html (spending on bottled water was $10 billion 
in 2005). 
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As noted earlier, however, most people in this market do 
not like to dwell or even comment upon its commercial side. 
Orphaned children are never sold (either legally or 
linguistically).  Instead, they are matched with their “forever” 
families.45  Sperm and eggs are “donated” even when they cost 
tens of thousands of dollars,46 and surrogate mothers lend their 
wombs to help infertile couples.47 
However, the semantics in this area do not transform the 
underlying reality.  When parents purchase eggs or sperm, 
when they contract with surrogates, when they choose a child 
to adopt or an embryo to transfer, they are doing business.   
Intermediaries are making money in all of these transactions, 
and children are being acquired and exchanged through market 
mechanisms. 
Furthermore, the law is unquestionably being shaped by 
semantics as well.  As one court pointed out, “semantical 
distinctions are significant in this context, because language 
defines legal status and can limit legal rights.”48  Consider 
Massachusetts, for example, where it is criminal to sell 
embryos or gametes for research, but perfectly legal to “donate” 
them for reproductive purposes.49 
                                                          
 45. Cf.  Laura Mansnerus, A Lucrative Industry Booms on the Side, N.Y.  
TIMES, Oct.  26, 1998, at A16 (“As the adoption industry grows .  .  .  
peripheral services have multiplied.”). 
 46. See Gina Kolata, Clinics Selling Embryos Made for ‘Adoption’, N.Y.  
TIMES, Nov.  23, 1997, § 1, at 1; see also ASRM Guidelines for Oocyte Donor 
Compensation, supra note 14, at 306.   The ASRM guidelines state: 
Compensation based on a reasonable assessment of the time, 
inconvenience, and discomfort associated with oocyte retrieval can 
and should be distinguished from payment for the oocytes themselves.   
Payment based on such an assessment is also consistent with 
employment and other situations in which individuals are 
compensated for activities demanding time, stress, physical effort, 
and risk. 
 47. Krittivas Mukherjee, Rent-a-Womb in India Fuels Surrogate 
Motherhood Debate, REUTERS, Feb.  5, 2007, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/inDepthNews/idUSDEL29873520070205. 
 48. Davis v.  Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Tenn.  1992). 
 49. MASS.  ANN.  LAWS ch.  111L, § 8 (LexisNexis 2008).  The law states: 
[n]o person shall knowingly and for valuable consideration purchase, 
sell, transfer or otherwise obtain human embryos, gametes or 
cadaveric tissue for research purposes.   Nothing in this section shall 
prohibit a person from banking or donating their gametes for personal 
future use, or from donating their gametes to another person or from 
donating their gametes for research.  Nothing in this chapter shall 
prohibit or regulate the use of in vitro fertilization for reproductive 
purposes. 
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As people—as parents—we do not like to think of children 
as economic or legal objects, or to consider ourselves as paying 
for something that is truly priceless.  As the legal scholar 
Margaret Jane Radin has argued, “Conceiving of any child in 
market rhetoric wrongs personhood.”50  What we argue is that 
we have to acknowledge the deeply commercial nature of 
assisted reproduction.  Because if we do not acknowledge its 
commercial nature and instead treat this realm as a purely 
private, intimate, and emotional endeavor, we risk making 
serious policy mistakes. 
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE “BABY BUSINESS” 
After describing the market for reproductive technologies, 
we now describe six major problems that emanate from the 
current state of the baby market.   These are price, inequity, 
the absence of property rights, identity, health risks, and 
potential societal costs. 
A. PRICE 
Perhaps the most conspicuous feature of the baby business 
is the high cost of assisted reproductive services.   Indeed, ART 
has become a big business in the United States precisely 
because it costs so much.51  Each cycle costs more than 
$10,000,52 and it frequently takes multiple cycles to achieve 
pregnancy, with success rates decreasing with each try.53  
Studies have found that the average cost per successful 
delivery for IVF ranges between $66,667 for the first cycle to 
$114,286 by the sixth.54  In this market, however, average costs 
do not tell us too much, since success rates vary so widely by 
patient-specific factors, especially age.55  For women with low 
success rates (below 10 percent or 15 percent) for example, the 
cost of producing a baby goes up to well over $100,000 
                                                          
 50. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV.  L.  REV.  
1849, 1927 (1987). 
 51. See Henne et.  al., supra note 23, at 104. 
 52. Id.  at 106. 
 53. 2005 ART REPORT, supra note 16, at 36–37. 
 54. See e.g., Peter J.  Neumann et al., The Cost of a Successful Delivery 
with in Vitro Fertilization, 331 NEW ENG.  J.  MED.  239, 239–43 (1994). 
 55. See Bradley J.  Van Voorhis, In Vitro Fertilization, 356 NEW ENG.  J.  
MED.  379, 380 (2008) (“The effect of a woman’s age on the outcomes of IVF 
with her own eggs is striking.”). 
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(depending on the price per cycle).56  Costs per cycle are also 
higher when a donor egg is used, because, as noted above, 
donated eggs generally cost between $3,000 and $5,000.   An 
average cycle with a donor egg is then estimated to cost 
between $15,000 and $25,000, meaning that the cost per live 
birth (using a 51 percent success rate) runs between $29,411 
and $49,020.57 
B. INEQUITY 
Inevitably, such high costs result in inequity, since only a 
fortunate few can afford to spend $50,000, much less $100,000, 
in order to have a chance at a baby.58  Many couples are forced 
out of the baby business from the outset, and many more find 
themselves burdened by the huge expenses they accumulate on 
the way to parenthood or exhaustion.   While some non-profit 
groups like the InterNational Council for Infertility 
Information Dissemination (INCIID) are tackling the issue of 
inequity by providing IVF scholarships for those in need and 
others like RESOLVE are fighting for more expansive 
insurance coverage, ART in the United States remains largely 
the province of the rich, or at least the well-to-do.   Poor, 
infertile people suffer twice as a result, first from the inability 
to conceive for free and then from the unaffordability of 
assisted reproduction. 
Theoretically, this kind of inherent inequity could be 
deemed unconstitutional if the right to procreate is protected 
by the Constitution.  To date, the Supreme Court has not 
directly addressed the right to procreate by IVF.59  However, in 
a case about the right to the use of contraceptives, the Court 
has indicated that the right to procreate (or not to) is protected: 
“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the 
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
                                                          
 56. Henne, supra note 23. 
 57. Id.  at 109 (estimating cost of donor egg cycle based on Internet 
search).   Cycles with donor eggs, on average, have higher success rates (about 
50%) which are not dependent on the age of the woman undergoing IVF.   Van 
Voorhis, supra note 55, at 382. 
 58. See Tarun Jain & Mark D.  Hornstein, To Pay or Not to Pay, 80 
FERTILITY & STERILITY 27, 27 (2003) (“Because of this high out-of-pocket cost, 
many financially constrained infertile couples are excluded from access to this 
care.”). 
 59. See Davis v.  Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn.  1992). 
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affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a 
child.”60  Such statements have led scholars like John 
Robertson to conclude that there may be a constitutionally 
protected right to procreate and that this right may extend to 
the use of new reproductive technologies.61 
To be sure, a right to procreate does not necessarily 
translate into a right to have the cost of reproductive 
technologies covered by the state.  For example, in Maher v. 
Roe, the Supreme Court held that the right to an abortion did 
not include the right to state funding for it.62  The Court wrote: 
The Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to pay the 
pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent women, or indeed to 
pay any of the medical expenses of indigents .  .  .  .   An indigent 
woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a 
consequence of Connecticut’s decision to fund childbirth; she 
continues as before to be dependent on private sources for the service 
she desires.   The State may have made childbirth a more attractive 
alternative, thereby influencing the woman’s decision, but it has 
imposed no restriction on access to abortions that was not already 
there.   The indigency that may make it difficult—and in some cases, 
perhaps, impossible—for some women to have abortions is neither 
created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut regulation.63 
Still, even if the costs of ART are not deemed worthy of 
state funding, the current inequities in this market seem well 
worthy of state concern. 
Meanwhile, rather than addressing these inequities, the 
current system of insurance coverage in the United States 
actually serves to exacerbate them.64  At the time of this 
                                                          
 60. Eisenstadt v.  Baird, 405 U.S.  438, 453 (1972). 
 61. See John A.  Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of 
Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA.  L.  REV.  405, 428–29 (1983).   
Robertson states: 
There is a strong argument that married persons do have a right to 
engage in noncoital, collaborative arrangements to overcome 
infertility.   An infertile couple’s interest in genetic continuity, in 
gestating and giving birth, and in rearing the offspring is identical to 
the interest of a fertile couple .  .  .  .   An interpretation extending the 
right to procreate to noncoital and collaborative reproduction will 
have significant practical effects.   It will give fertile or infertile 
married persons the legal right (subject, of course, to regulations that 
serve compelling state interests) to make reproduction a collaborative 
enterprise.   This right will include the ability to contract with others 
for their sperm, ovum, uterus, or child and the ability to forge an 
agreement for assigning the entitlements and duties that affect the 
child. 
 62. Maher v.  Roe, 432 U.S.  464, 474 (1977). 
 63. Id.  at 469, 474. 
 64. See JESSICA ARONS, FUTURE CHOICES ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
SPAR.HARRINGTON.WEB 2/20/2009  12:13:31 PM 
52 MINN.  J.L.  SCI.  & TECH. [Vol.  10:1 
 
 
writing, only fourteen states required some form of coverage of 
ART.65  Of these states, moreover, only twelve require coverage 
of infertility services, while the remaining two only require that 
insurance companies offer coverage.66  Further, of the twelve 
states that mandate coverage, only ten mandate coverage of 
IVF.67  California and New York, for example, explicitly allow 
IVF to be excluded from coverage,68 and New York further 
limits coverage to women who are on Medicaid, uninsured, or 
have purchased individual insurance policies.69 California and 
Connecticut laws, along with those of several other states, 
allow religious employers to exempt coverage of infertility 
services not consistent with their beliefs.70  In addition, Hawaii 
                                                          
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 8 (2007) (“For most people then, having health 
insurance coverage of some or all infertility treatments may make the 
difference between accessing those services or not.”); see also Jain & 
Hornstein, supra note 58, at 29 (“Nationally mandated health insurance 
coverage for infertility services, including IVF, will provide equal access and 
care to all couples with infertility.”). 
 65. The fourteen states which cover infertility services include Arkansas, 
California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, 
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, and West Virginia.  AM.  
SOC’Y FOR REPROD.  MED., STATE INFERTILITY INSURANCE LAWS (2008), 
http://www.asrm.org/Patients/insur.html; INT’L COUNCIL ON INFERTILITY 
INFO.  DISSEMINATION, STATES MANDATING INFERTILITY INSURANCE 
COVERAGE (2004), http://inciid.org/article.php?id=275.   For a good summary of 
the state laws on infertility, see ARONS, supra note 64, at 8–11. 
 66. See ARONS, supra note 64, at 10. 
 67. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE LAWS 
RELATED TO INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR INFERTILITY TREATMENT (Oct.  2008), 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/50infert.htm. 
 68. See CAL.  INS.  CODE § 10119.6(a) (West 2005) (“On and after January 
1, 1990, every insurer issuing, renewing, or amending a policy of disability 
insurance which covers hospital, medical, or surgical expenses on a group 
basis shall offer coverage of infertility treatment, except in vitro fertilization .  
.  .  .”); N.Y.  INS.  LAW § 3221(k)(6)(C)(v) (McKinney Supp.  2008) (“Coverage 
shall not be required to include the diagnosis and treatment of infertility in 
connection with: (I) in vitro fertilization, gamete intrafallopian tube transfers 
or zygote intrafallopian tube transfers .  .  .  .”); NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, supra note 69. 
 69. See N.Y.  INS.  LAW  § 3221; Richard Pérez-Peña, State Will Require 
Coverage of Treatment for Infertility, N.Y.  TIMES, May 17, 2002, at B4. 
 70. See CAL.  INS.  CODE § 10119.6(d) (“Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to require any employer that is a religious organization to offer 
coverage for forms of treatment of infertility in a manner inconsistent with the 
religious organization’s religious and ethical principles.”); CONN.  GEN.  STAT.  
ANN.  § 38a-509(c)(1) (West 2007) (“Any insurance company, hospital or 
medical service corporation, or health care center may issue to a religious 
employer an individual health insurance policy that excludes coverage for 
methods of diagnosis and treatment of infertility that are contrary to the 
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provides for a one-time only IVF benefit with conditions, 
including that the wife’s eggs must be fertilized by her 
husband’s sperm and that the couple must have a five-year 
history of infertility.71  Coverage is therefore sketchy at best, 
even in those states that offer it in some form.   This despite a 
1995 study estimating that covering infertility would only raise 
annual insurance premiums for all subscribers by about three 
dollars per month.72 
C. ABSENCE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Another major problem plaguing the baby business is the 
absence of property rights, especially with respect to the 
disposition of frozen embryos created by a married couple that 
later separates or divorces, or where one or both spouses dies.73  
This section discusses case law and statutes that address 
property rights with respect to embryos.74 
Courts have been the refuge of last resort in this area, 
called upon to answer such questions as whether a woman 
should be allowed to implant or donate embryos made with her 
eggs and her ex-husband’s sperm against his will.  At first 
glance, contract law seems like an easy solution, allowing a 
couple to decide what should happen to their embryos in the 
event of divorce.  However, courts have ruled differently 
concerning contracts for the disposition of embryos, reflecting 
an absence of agreed-upon standards. 
In the 1992 case of Davis v. Davis,75 the first case 
regarding rights to excess embryos, the Supreme Court of 
                                                          
religious employer’s bona fide religious tenets.”); see also ARONS, supra note 
64, at 9, 42 n.45 (seven states’ laws contain an exemption for religious 
organizations). 
 71. HAW.  REV.  STAT.  § 431:10A-116.5 (Supp.  2007). 
 72. Peter J.  Neumann, Should Health Insurance Cover IVF? Issues and 
Options, 22 J.  HEALTH POL.  POL’Y & LAW 1215, 1219 (1997). 
 73. See, e.g., A.Z.  v.  B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1055 (Mass.  2000) (“While 
IVF has been available for over two decades and has been the focus of much 
academic commentary, there is little law on the enforceability of agreements 
concerning the disposition of frozen preembryos.”). 
 74. Property rights involving embryos is the major issue in the field.   
There are clearly other issues like the rights of gamete donors and surrogacy 
donors that will not be addressed in detail here.   For example, some states 
provide that oocyte donors are not legal parents.   See, e.g., OKLA.  STAT.  ANN.  
tit.  10, § 554 (West 2007).   In addition, courts in a number of states have 
addressed surrogacy contracts.   See, e.g., R.R.  v.  M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 
(Mass.  1998); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J.  1988). 
 75. Davis v.  Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn.  1992). 
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Tennessee held that Junior Davis’s right not to have genetic 
children outweighed the rights of his ex-wife to donate their 
embryos.76  When the couple divorced, Mary Sue Davis initially 
sought to have the frozen embryos implanted to become 
pregnant; by the time the case reached the state’s high court, 
however, she was remarried and wanted to donate them.77  Her 
ex-husband Junior, however, opposed both uses of the seven 
frozen embryos left in storage at the Knoxville Fertility 
Clinic.78  The couple did not have a contract beforehand, nor did 
Tennessee have a relevant statute.79  There was likewise no 
case law to guide the court.80  The court first decided that 
preembryos were not persons, nor were they property; rather, 
they were entitled to “special respect because of their potential 
for human life.”81  The court then determined that contracts on 
such matters are enforceable.82 
Since Davis, however, other courts have come out 
differently on whether related contracts are enforceable.83  In 
Kass v. Kass,84 for example, the New York Court of Appeals 
held that Maureen and Steven Kass’s contract providing for 
donating embryos for research was controlling, even though 
Maureen sought to use them to achieve pregnancy after the 
                                                          
 76. Id.   at 604.   The Davis court stated that courts should look to the 
wishes of the man and woman first, then any prior agreement, before 
engaging in an interest-balancing test to determine the disposition of embryos.  
See id.; see also J.B.  v.  M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 717, 720 (N.J.  2001) (finding that 
the wife’s right not to procreate outweighed the husband’s right to use their 
frozen embryos, and that the seven frozen embryos should be destroyed). 
 77. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589–90. 
 78. Id.  at 590. 
 79. Id.  at 590, 592.   The court noted that Louisiana was the only state 
that had a statute that addressed the disposition of frozen embryos, stating 
that they could not be intentionally destroyed and that property right disputes 
should be resolved in the “best interest” of the frozen embryo.   Id.  at 590 n.1. 
 80. Id.  at 590 & n.2. 
 81. Id.  at 597. 
 82. See id. 
 83. Compare Kass v.  Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 175, 181 (N.Y.  1998), and 
Roman v.  Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 54–55 (Tex.  App.  2006) (upholding an 
agreement between the a couple providing for discarding their unused 
embryos in the event of a divorce), with A.Z.  v.  B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1056 
(Mass.  2000) (holding that the consent form only defined “the donors’ 
relationship as a unit with the clinic” and was not a binding agreement 
between them in the event of a disagreement as to the disposition of the frozen 
preembryos). 
 84. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 174. 
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couple’s divorce.85  Two years later in 2000, however, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held a contract 
regarding embryo disposition unenforceable; the contract 
provided that in the event of a separation, the wife could 
implant the leftover embryos.86  While the court found the 
contract unenforceable on several grounds, it also stated, 
crucially, that, even if the contract were a valid one, “we would 
not enforce an agreement that would compel one donor to 
become a parent against his or her will.”87  Courts so far are 
unwilling to enforce contracts that result in a person 
procreating against his or her will. 
Other states, meanwhile, have passed laws that 
specifically address the disposition of embryos.88  In 1986, for 
example, Louisiana passed legislation stating that “[a]n in vitro 
fertilized human ovum exists as a juridical person,” meaning it 
has the right to sue and be sued, that it is a separate entity 
from the medical facility it is stored at, and it is not property of 
the man or woman whose gametes created it.89  A Florida 
statute enacted in 1993, by contrast, requires a written 
                                                          
 85. See id.  at 180 (“Agreements between progenitors, or gamete donors, 
regarding disposition of their pre-zygotes should generally be presumed valid 
and binding, and enforced in any dispute between them.   Indeed, parties 
should be encouraged in advance, before embarking on IVF and 
cryopreservation, to think through possible contingencies and carefully specify 
their wishes in writing.”) (citations omitted); see also Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 
54–55; Litowitz v.  Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 271 (Wash.  2002) (upholding a 
contract which provided that cryopreserved embryos be destroyed five years 
after their creation).. 
 86. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1054, 1056. 
 87. See id.  at 1056–58.   The court stated that “forced procreation is not 
an area amenable to judicial enforcement.” 
 88. Indeed, in one case, the court wrote that it anticipated “that the issue 
will ultimately be resolved by the Texas Legislature.”  Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 
44 & n.6. 
 89. LA.  REV.  STAT.  ANN.  §§ 9:123–126 (2008).   Section 9:126 of the 
statute provides: 
An in vitro fertilized human ovum is a biological human being which 
is not the property of the physician which acts as an agent of 
fertilization, or the facility which employs him or the donors of the 
sperm and ovum.   If the in vitro fertilization patients express their 
identity, then their rights as parents as provided under the Louisiana 
Civil Code will be preserved.   If the in vitro fertilization patients fail 
to express their identity, then the physician shall be deemed to be 
temporary guardian of the in vitro fertilized human ovum until 
adoptive implantation can occur.   A court in the parish where the in 
vitro fertilized ovum is located may appoint a curator, upon motion of 
the in vitro fertilization patients, their heirs, or physicians who 
caused in vitro fertilization to be performed, to protect the in vitro 
fertilized human ovum’s rights. 
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agreement providing for the disposition of eggs, sperm, and 
preembryos in the event of divorce, death, or other unforeseen 
circumstances.90 
At the moment, therefore, there is little consensus in the 
United States about the legal status of the embryo.  The reason 
for this gap is obvious—any national attempt to define the 
embryo would run headlong into the perilous debate over 
abortion. Yet in the absence of such a conversation, business is 
being conducted without any underlying agreement about 
property rights, and courts are forced to make Solomonic 
decisions without the benefits of an underlying law. 
D. IDENTITY 
The great benefit of assisted reproduction technology is 
that it has allowed millions of people to become parents in new 
ways, combining their own genetic material with that of 
donors.  One of the main problems created as a result, however, 
is that the children who result from these technologies often 
have no knowledge, or only partial knowledge, of their genetic 
origins.  And as these children age into adulthood, it appears 
that they, like legions of adopted children before them, are 
eager to learn of their genetic origins and angry that this 
information is denied them.  Or as Katrina Clark, born of 
sperm donation, wrote in the Washington Post: 
The children born of these transactions are people, too .  .  .  .   I’m 
here to tell you that emotionally, many of us are not keeping up.   We 
didn’t ask to be born into this situation, with its limitations and 
confusion.   It’s hypocritical of parents and medical professionals to 
assume that biological roots won’t matter to the “products” of the 
cryobanks’ service, when the longing for a biological relationship is 
what brings customers to the banks in the first place.   We offspring 
are recognizing the right that was stripped from us at birth—the 
right to know who both our parents are .  .  .  .   That was when the 
emptiness came over me.   I realized that I am, in a sense, a freak.   I 
really, truly would never have a dad.   I finally understood what it 
meant to be donor-conceived, and I hated it.91 
Katrina’s situation speaks to more than a personal longing 
for identity.  It raises the key issue of rights: the right to 
personal information; the right to medical information; and the 
                                                          
 90. FLA.  STAT.  ANN.  § 742.17 (West 2005). 
 91. Katrina Clark, Who’s Your Daddy?: Mine Was an Anonymous Sperm 
Donor.   That Made Me Mad.   So I Decided to Find Him., WASH.  POST, Dec.  
17, 2006, at B1–B5. 
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right, perhaps, to a father.  Under the current system of 
assisted reproduction, the rights of the prospective parent 
predominate.  Parents contract for the services they desire, and 
providers essentially treat them as a delicate hybrid of patient 
and customer.  What is lost in this equation is the product—the 
child—that results.  Do these children have any rights that 
trump those of their parents?  Can they demand access to their 
genetic parents’ medical information?  Can they track their 
genetic siblings and ensure, at a minimum, that they do not 
procreate with them?  At the moment, the law offers few 
answers.  Yet as these children grow in number and age, they 
will demand, as they should, some form of redress. 
E.  HEALTH RISKS 
Although the health risks of assisted reproduction are 
apparently minimal, there has nevertheless been a conspicuous 
dearth of studies examining the risks to mothers, egg donors, 
and children.92  Part of the reason for this gap may simply be 
time: ART has only been around, after all, for thirty years.93  
Yet one study from 2002 found that children conceived with 
ICSI and IVF were more than twice as likely as normally-
conceived children to have a major birth defect.94  Another 
                                                          
 92. See generally PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, REPRODUCTION 
AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE REGULATION OF NEW BIOTECHNOLOGIES 175–76, 
194 (2004), available at 
http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/reproductionandresponsibility/_pcbe_final_re
production_and_responsibility.pdf (calling for long-term study of the health 
effects). 
 93. See id.  at 38 (noting that the oldest person conceived from assisted 
reproductive technologies is in her mid-twenties); Van Voorhis, supra note 55, 
at 383 (“Epidemiologic studies to date have been limited in many cases by 
small samples and by the fact that most women who have undergone IVF have 
not yet reached the age of peak cancer incidence; nevertheless, these studies 
have generally been reassuring.”). 
 94. Michèle Hansen et al., The Risk of Major Birth Defects after 
Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection and in Vitro Fertilization, 346 NEW ENG.  J.  
MED.  725, 729 (2002) (“The increase in the risk of a major birth defect 
associated with assisted conception remained significant when only singleton 
or term singleton infants were considered, as well as after adjustment for 
maternal age and parity, the sex of the infant, and correlation between 
siblings.”); see also Allen A.  Mitchell, Infertility Treatment—More Risks and 
Challenges, 346 NEW ENG.  J.  MED.  769, 769 (2002).   Mitchell writes: 
The use of assisted reproductive technology appears roughly to double 
the risk of having a term singleton with low birth weight or a child 
with a major birth defect.   However, the majority of couples who 
require assistance with reproduction will not be affected, since 
according to these studies, the likelihood of having a term singleton 
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found they were twice as likely to have a low-birth weight.95 
Studies have also shown that ovarian stimulation—of both 
egg donors and IVF patients—can occasionally result in a 
dangerous form of hyperstimulation that, in very rare cases, 
can lead to death.96  Questions also lurk regarding the effect of 
egg donation on the donor’s fertility and on possible links to 
breast or gynecological cancers.97  Egg donors may even be at 
increased risk for infertility as a result of the hormones and 
procedures.98 
Moreover, even if ART itself does not heighten the risk of 
birth defects, ART as it is currently practiced leads to a large 
increase in multiple pregnancies, which incontrovertibly 
contributes to dangerous pregnancies and higher-risk births.99  
In traditional pregnancies, multiple births occur about 3 
percent of the time.100  By contrast, ART procedures as recently 
as 2005 led to a more than 30 percent incidence of twins or 
higher-order births.101  The causation is clear.   Because women 
(and perhaps their doctors) are anxious for a given cycle of 
                                                          
infant of normal birth weight is about 94 percent, and the likelihood 
of having an infant who is free of major defects is about 91 percent. 
 95. Laura A.  Schieve et al., Low and Very Low Birth Weight in Infants 
Conceived with Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology, 346 NEW ENG.  J.  
MED.  731, 731, 734 (2002). 
 96. Rabin, supra note 7.  But see Van Voorhis, supra note 55, at 383: 
[t]he ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome is a short-term consequence 
of gonadotropin stimulation and early pregnancy.   This syndrome, 
which occurs in less than 5% of IVF cycles, consists of ovarian 
swelling, pelvic pain, and hemodynamic fluid shifts, often 
accompanied by ascites.   The disorder almost always resolves after 
several weeks, although in rare cases, death due to thromboembolism 
has been reported. 
 97. See Mary Anne Rossing et al., Ovarian Tumors in a Cohort of Infertile 
Women, 331 NEW ENG.  J.  MED.  771, 771 (1994); Hempel, supra note 40, at 21; 
Rabin, supra note 7; RUTH FARRELL ET AL., GENETICS & PUB.  POLICY CTR., 
IVF, EGG DONATION, AND WOMEN’S HEALTH 4–5 (2006), 
http://www.dnapolicy.org/resources/IVF_Egg_Donation_Womens_Health_final.
pdf; see also Debora Spar, The Egg Trade—Making Sense of the Market for 
Human Oocytes, 356 NEW ENG.  J.  MED.  1289, 1290 (2007) (calling for long-
term studies of the effect of ovarian stimulation on egg donors). 
 98. See ASRM Guidelines for Oocyte Donor Compensation, supra note 14. 
 99. See Ctrs.  for Disease Control and Prevention, Contribution of Assisted 
Reproductive Technology and Ovulation-Inducing Drugs to Triplet and Higher-
Order Multiple Birth—United States, 1980–1997, 49 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY 
WKLY.  REP.  535, 535–38 (2000), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm4924.pdf. 
 100. 2005 ART Report, supra note 16, at 22. 
 101. Id. 
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treatment to lead to a live birth, multiple embryos are often 
implanted at the same time.102  Indeed, in 2005, more than 47 
percent of IVF cycles performed in the United States involved 
the implantation of three or more embryos.103 
In many of these cases, some or all of the embryos failed to 
develop either into fetuses or live children.  Yet, ironically, 
when multiple embryo transfer is successful, in the sense that 
all the embryos survive, it also poses stark health risks for 
these embryos, including premature birth, low-birth weight, 
and an increased likelihood of birth defects or even death.104  
Well aware of these risks, the American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) recommends that its members 
not transfer more than two embryos to any woman under the 
age of thirty-five.105  The law in this area, however, remains 
mute, and there is no legal penalty for doctors who choose to 
ignore the ASRM’s recommendations. 
F.  POTENTIAL COSTS TO SOCIETY 
Currently, convention holds that the costs of assisted 
reproduction are entirely private: prospective parents pay out 
of pocket for what they want and can afford.   In many 
instances, though, the costs of their decisions are also being 
borne by the rest of us, through such channels as higher labor 
and delivery costs (for complicated pregnancies), higher 
neonatal costs (for babies born prematurely as a result of 
multiple pregnancies), and possibly even higher educational 
costs as children who were born prematurely or at below-
normal weights enter the public school system.106  The average 
cost of treating a premature infant, for example, is $58,000—a 
sum that is now simply absorbed by hospitals or insurance 
companies and rolled into the escalating costs of health care.107  
                                                          
 102. See id.  at 45. 
 103. Id.  at 44. 
 104. Id.  at 22–23 (premature birth); id.  at 24 (low-birth weight).   But see 
id.  at 70 (indicating that the percentage of multiple births conceived as a 
result of assisted reproduction has decreased over the past ten years). 
 105. Practice Comm.  of the Soc’y for Assisted Reprod.  Tech.  & the 
Practice Comm.  of the Am.  Soc’y for Reprod.  Med., Guidelines on Number of 
Embryos Transferred, 86 FERTILITY & STERILITY S51, S51 (2006). 
 106. See Jane E.  Allen, Puzzling Rise in Early Births, L.A.  TIMES, Jan.  
20, 2003, at F1. 
 107. See id.; see also Antoinette Martin, Multiple Births: A Wake-up Call, 
N.Y.  TIMES, Feb.  8, 1996, at C1 (noting that thirty-five percent of the cost is 
borne by Medicare and Medicaid); cf.  Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive 
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This cost is well above the $4,300 typically required to cover 
the costs of a newborn.108  Premature births are also on the 
rise: in 2005, 12.7 percent of births were preterm, an increase 
of 9 percent over 2000 and 20 percent since 1990.109  Over the 
longer term, meanwhile, if it turns out that the use of 
hormones in reproductive technologies leads to a heightened 
risk of certain cancers or a higher incidence of next-generation 
infertility, these costs, too, will become part of the nation’s 
ongoing health care burden. 
Other potential costs of ART are social rather than 
financial.  Both egg donors and surrogates, for instance, are 
frequently women of limited means who agree to “help couples 
create a family” in exchange for relatively large sums of 
money.110  Do these commercial relationships constitute 
exploitation?  Though it is hard to say for sure, feminist 
scholars certainly think so.111  The basic facts of both 
                                                          
Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA.  
L.  REV.  603, 626 (2003) (“Fertility clinics do not absorb the additional 
expenses incurred with multifetal pregnancies, which can be substantial, 
while they would lose business if their pregnancy success rates declined 
significantly.”). 
 108. Tim Bonfield, March of Dimes Targeting Early Births, CINCINNATI 
ENQUIRER, Feb.  3, 2003, available at 
http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2003/02/03/loc_marchofdimes03.html. 
 109. Joyce A.  Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2005, 56 NAT’L VITAL 
STAT.  REP.  1, 3, 20 (2007), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr56/nvsr56_06.pdf. 
 110. See ASRM Guidelines for Oocyte Donor Compensation, supra note 14 
(“Both monetary compensation and oocyte sharing create the possibility of 
undue inducement and exploitation in the oocyte donation process.   Women 
may agree to provide oocytes in response to financial need.”); Krittivas 
Mukherjee, Rent-a-Womb in India Fuels Surrogate Motherhood Debate, 
REUTERS, Feb.  5, 2007, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/inDepthNews/idUSDEL29873520070205 
(calling surrogacy an “exploitation of the poor by the rich”). 
 111. See GENA COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE 2 (1985) (“Just as the 
patriarchal state now finds it acceptable to market parts of a woman’s body 
(breast, vagina, buttocks) for sexual purposes in prostitution and the larger 
sex industry, so it will soon find it reasonable to market other parts of a 
woman (womb, ovaries, egg) for reproductive purposes.”); JANICE G.  
RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS 81 (1993).   She writes: 
Most so-called surrogates arrive in court from a background of 
economic disadvantage or dead-endedness .  .  .  .   A legal recognition 
of male dominance, thus a legal recognition of the ways in which 
women have been channeled into surrogacy and motherhood at any 
cost to themselves, is a necessary legal precondition to women’s 
equality.   Rights are related to actual social relations, and it is male-
dominant relations that are definitive in the legal area—the man’s 
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relationships are clear.  Egg donation is neither easy nor 
pleasant: the procedure involves using hormones to induce 
ovulation and extracting eggs for use in IVF.   It can cause 
pain, bloating, diarrhea, and nausea.  Yet egg agencies 
sometimes receive hundreds of applications each month,112 and 
feature hundreds of women who receive, on average, about 
$5,000 for their labors.113  Most of these donors fit a common 
profile, coming, as one recent news article reported, from: 
“[C]ollege towns, where the perfect specimens—young, SAT–tested 
women deep in debt—can be recruited through school newspaper ads, 
websites like craigslist, and photocopied fliers stapled to trees.   The 
ads probably won’t mention the medical and psychological screenings.   
Or the injections of hormones.   Or the suctioning.   They will mention 
families in need.   And they will promise cash.”114 
Meanwhile, the price of a surrogate is so high in the United 
States (around $50,000) that some couples are turning to 
women in less developed countries like India, where wombs can 
be rented for as little as $10,000–$12,000.115  “For the 
surrogates—usually lower middleclass housewives—money is 
the primary motivator.”116  One such woman, Jyoti Dave, 
rented her womb to provide food for her family after her 
husband lost his limbs in an accident.117 
Reasonable people can likely disagree about the societal 
costs of such arrangements.  However, practices like egg 
                                                          
relation to his sperm, his money, his wife, and the women who may 
serve as surrogate wives, that is, as surrogate breeders. 
Julie Murphy, Egg Farming and Women’s Future, in TEST-TUBE WOMEN: 
WHAT FUTURE FOR MOTHERHOOD? 68, 73 (Rita Arditti et al.  eds., 1989) 
(“Through egg farming, women can be divided into two groups: egg donors and 
embryo recipients .  .  .  .   Two reproductive classes of women can degrade 
women as ‘parts’ of ‘reproductive bodies’ and diminish our chances of obtaining 
reproductive rights for all women.”). 
 112. Rene Almeling, Selling Genes, Selling Gender: Egg Agencies, Sperm 
Banks, and the Medical Market in Genetic Material, 72 AM.  SOC.  REV.  319, 
326, 328 (2007) (noting that a particular egg agency received more than a 
hundred applications per day, and both agencies studied reject more than 
eighty percent of the applications); The Egg Donor Program, Welcome to the 
Egg Donor Program, http://www.eggdonation.com/recipient-
parents/RecipientParents.php (last visited Oct.  4, 2008) (indicating that the 
agency receives more than 400 applications per month). 
 113. See, e.g., Egg Donation, Inc., http://www.eggdonor.com (last visited 
Oct.  4, 2008) (stating that their egg donor database contains more than 600 of 
the “most exceptional and diverse” donors). 
 114. Hempel, supra note 40, at 19–20. 
 115. Mukherjee, supra note 110. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
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donation and surrogacy should, at a minimum, not be seen 
simply as the commercial or personal decisions of private 
individuals.  Instead, insofar as they touch upon social 
concerns—concerns about exploitation, or commodification, or 
the sale of women’s bodies—they need to be embedded in a 
broader discussion about societal costs and benefits. 
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR POLICY AND LEGAL CHANGE 
Frequently, participants in the baby business will argue 
that there is nothing that can, or should, be done to address 
these problems, either because the problems (like the absence 
of property rights or inequity) are too intractable, or because 
any legislative solutions could well bring about an even worse 
state of affairs.118  Some people worry about the politicization of 
medical decisions or about the consequences of any open debate 
on the legal status of the embryo.119  Others believe that 
private regulation has succeeded thus far.120 
From the outside, meanwhile, some critics argue that the 
entire area of assisted reproduction is morally wrong and that, 
in the words of the Protestant ethicist Paul Ramsey, “[m]en 
ought not to play God before they learn to be men, and after 
they have learned to be men they will not play God.”121 
We respectfully disagree with these objections because 
there are policies that could be put in place to govern the baby 
business—policies that would not eliminate the trade or even 
unduly constrain it, but would make it work better for all of the 
parties involved: parents, doctors, donors, and most 
importantly, the children who are conceived through assisted 
reproduction and the society that receives them.  This section 
presents some specific recommendations along these lines. 
A.  PROVIDE PATIENTS, EGG DONORS, AND SURROGATES WITH 
                                                          
 118. See generally Daar, supra note 22. 
 119. See George J.  Annas & Sherman Elias, Politics, Morals and Embryos: 
Can Bioethics in the U.S.  Rise Above Politics? 431 NATURE 19, 19–20 (2004); 
see also JANE MAIENSCHEIN, WHOSE VIEW OF LIFE? 5 (2003) (“Our political 
acceptance of this technology shows that our society has a range of reasonable 
views of when a life actually begins.   The problem is how to accommodate all 
these different and competing views.”). 
 120. Rick Weiss, Fertility Innovation or Exploitation?, WASH.  POST, Feb.  9, 
1998, at A1. 
 121. PAUL RAMSEY, FABRICATED MAN: THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL 
138 (1970). 
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ACCESSIBLE AND RELIABLE INFORMATION 
This first recommendation is straightforward and should, 
in our opinion, be non-controversial.  It is simply to demand 
that all providers in the baby business supply their patients  
with basic information regarding the risks of any procedures 
they are planning to undergo; the relevant success rates (i.e., 
not the average rates of IVF success over all ages if the patient 
is forty-two, but the rates of success for forty-two-year-olds);122 
and the estimated costs.  Ideally, patients also need to be 
informed about all their available options.123  The 1992 
Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act (FCSRCA) 
went a long way toward reaching this policy objective, but we 
need to go further still.124  Under FCSRCA, clinics report their 
data by type of procedure (IVF, GIFT, ZIFT), by cause of 
infertility, by age (younger than 35, 35–37, 38–40, 41–42), and 
by type of cycle (using fresh or frozen non-donor or fresh or 
frozen donor eggs).125  What FCSRCA lacks, however, is any 
mechanism for prodding clinics to share their information 
directly with patients and, more importantly, any means of 
penalizing those clinics that do not report. 
Massachusetts provides a good example of how a state can 
use legislation to address such concerns.  Since the 2005 
passage of “An Act Enhancing Regenerative Medicine in the 
Commonwealth,” the Massachusetts Department of Public 
Health must provide physicians and other health care 
providers with documents to supply their infertility patients 
who undergo in vitro.  These include: 
an informational pamphlet, describing the procedure by which an egg 
is extracted from the patient, including all short and long-term 
potential health impacts of the procedure on the patient, any drugs or 
devices to be used, including whether they have received approval 
from the United States Food and Drug Administration, the risks 
involved, any discomfort and side effects that may be experienced, 
any alternatives which the patient may have and their attendant 
risks and benefits, medical treatment available to the patient should 
                                                          
 122. See 2005 ART REPORT, supra note 16, at 26–27 (indicating declining 
success rates as age increases). 
 123. See Daar, supra note 22, at 630 (“Patient understanding about the 
techniques of treatment are [sic] at odds with their expectations of such 
treatment, one possible consequence may be inappropriate or over utilization 
of fertility therapy.”). 
 124. See, e.g., Reporting of Pregnancy Success Rates From Assisted 
Reproductive Technology Programs, 65 Fed.  Reg.  53,310, 53,312 (Sept.  1, 
2000). 
 125. 2005 ART REPORT, supra note 16, at 78. 
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complications arise, and that the particular treatment may involve 
currently unforeseeable risks to the patient, embryo or fetus.  A 
physician or other health care provider treating a woman with a 
procedure by which an egg is intended to be extracted shall provide 
the patient with this pamphlet or a legible copy thereof, and provide 
any other treatment information which may be specific to the 
patient’s treatment .  .  .  .126 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention seems to 
agree with the Massachusetts approach, noting recently that 
consumers in search of fertility treatment would like more 
information than they currently receive.127  Women in 
particular need to be more aware of the age-specific success 
rates of treatment, since age remains the single most important 
factor in determining a woman’s likelihood of achieving a 
successful pregnancy.128  A forty-year-old woman using her own 
eggs, for example, has a 23 percent chance of becoming 
pregnant in a given cycle of IVF, and a 16 percent chance of 
giving birth to a live child.129  A forty-five-year old woman, by 
contrast, has only a 2.5 percent chance of pregnancy and less 
than a 1 percent chance of a live birth.130  Women of all ages, 
moreover, need to understand how success rates vary by clinic 
and why an apparently low success rate could actually indicate 
that a particular clinic is agreeing to work with higher-risk 
patients, rather than boosting its statistics by only accepting 
those patients who are most likely to conceive.131 
It is therefore paramount that clinics provide patients with 
all of the relevant information, and that government entities 
play a small but crucial role in prompting clinics to comply.132 
                                                          
 126. MASS.  ANN.  LAWS ch.  111L, § 4(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2005).   The statute 
also requires informed consent.   § 4(a)(2). 
 127. Reporting of Pregnancy Success Rates from Assisted Reproductive 
Technology Programs, 65 Fed.  Reg.  at 53,312 (2000).   It notes: 
[i]ndeed, many providers and consumers have asked us to collect and 
report even more information than is currently included in the 
reporting system.  Many providers have expressed concern that 
without consideration for many patient treatment factors the report 
will misrepresent clinic success rates.   Of course, consumers are also 
very interested in a thorough and complete analysis, which will help 
in their goal of making an informed decision about ART. 
 128. 2005 ART REPORT, supra note 16, at 26–27, 30. 
 129. Id.  at 27. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See Gina Kolata, Fertility, Inc.: Clinics Race to Lure Clients, N.Y.  
TIMES, Jan.  1, 2002, at F1. 
 132. See Daar, supra note 22, at 629 (stating that if a “patient[‘s] 
understanding about the techniques of treatment are [sic] at odds with their 
SPAR.HARRINGTON.WEB 2/20/2009  12:13:31 PM 
2009] BUILDING A BETTER BABY BUSINESS 65 
B.  PERFORM STUDIES OF THE LONG-TERM RISK OF ART 
In addition to providing patients with the information that 
is currently available about IVF and other treatments, we also 
need to encourage the generation of further information about 
the long-term risks of ART—to mothers and egg donors and 
children—and then to reduce these risks as much as 
possible.133 For instance, it appears that male children born 
from ICSI, a very popular procedure in which a single sperm is 
injected directly into the egg, have higher than average levels 
of infertility and certain types of cancer.134  Some studies have 
also suggested that there are possibly long-term effects from 
hormone exposure including breast, ovarian, and even uterine 
cancer.135  As more and more women are exposed to these 
hormones, and as the children born from IVF-induced 
pregnancies reach adulthood and their own child-bearing years, 
we need to ensure that any possible long-term risks of IVF 
treatment are well tracked and studied. 
In the meantime, we already know that the greatest risk to 
a pregnant mother or in utero child is a multiple pregnancy.136  
Fifty percent of twins are born prematurely, as are 90 percent 
of triplets and nearly all higher-order births.137  Twins are six 
times more likely to suffer from cerebral palsy, and triplets are 
twenty times more likely.138  One out of every fifteen twins dies 
before their first birthday, as does one of every five triplets.139 
                                                          
expectations of such treatment, one possible consequence may be 
inappropriate or over utilization of fertility therapy”). 
 133. See supra notes 92–105 and accompanying text; see also PRESIDENT’S 
COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 92, at 194 (calling for more long-term 
study of ART); cf.  Mitchell, supra note 94 (stating that two studies that were 
published in 2002 “will help infertile couples to evaluate the risks they and 
their offspring might face if they choose to use assisted reproductive 
technology”). 
 134. Jennifer J.  Kurinzuk, Safety Issues in Assisted Reproduction, 18 HUM.  
REPROD.  925, 927 (2003), available at 
http://humrep.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/18/5/925?maxtoshow=&HITS=10
&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=1&title=ICSI&andorexacttitle=and&andorexac
ttitleabs=and&fulltext=cancer&andorexactfulltext=and&searchid=1&FIRSTI
NDEX=0&sortspec=relevance&resourcetype=HWCIT. 
 135. See Helen Pearson, Health Effects of Egg Donation May Take Decades 
to Emerge, 442 NATURE 607, 607–08 (2006). 
 136. See supra notes 99–105 and accompanying text. 
 137. AM.  SOC’Y FOR REPROD.  MED., PATIENT FACT SHEET: COMPLICATIONS 
OF MULTIPLE GESTATION (2008), 
http://www.asrm.org/Patients/FactSheets/complications_multiplebirths.pdf. 
 138. LIZA MUNDY, EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE 217 (2007). 
 139. See id. 
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As a result of these risks, emerging regulation in Europe 
prohibits doctors from transferring more than two embryos at a 
time and strongly recommends single embryo transfer (“SET”).   
In the United States, by contrast, there are only private 
guidelines issued by the ASRM, 140 and there is no mechanism 
to ensure long-term studies of the effects of fertility treatments 
on both the women who receive them and the children born as 
a result. 
C.  ESTABLISH A FORMAL SYSTEM FOR RECORDING DONOR 
IDENTITIES 
Our third recommendation is to establish a formal system 
for recording the identities of egg, sperm, and embryo donors.   
Currently we are making precisely the same mistake with 
children born of ART that we did with earlier generations of 
adopted children.141  Specifically, we are presuming that these 
children will not want to know their genetic origins.   Yet much 
of the evidence—both from the world of adoption and from the 
first generation of children (now adults) born of donated 
sperm—suggests precisely the opposite.142  Individuals want to 
know from whom they came.  They may not want to maintain 
any kind of emotional relationship with their birth mother, 
with their sperm donor, or with the woman who provided the 
egg from which they sprang, but they want to know, and we as 
a society owe it to them to provide that information. 
Increasingly, sperm banks are starting to move toward 
tracking donor contact information.143  In 1983, the Sperm 
Bank of California in Berkeley became the first to institute 
“donor identification release,” which allows offspring, upon 
turning eighteen, to contact the sperm bank to receive donor 
information.144  Other sperm banks have subsequently followed 
suit, and some have moved even more aggressively to enable 
offspring to contact their donors.145  Furthermore, after a 
fifteen-year-old boy conceived from sperm donation tracked 
                                                          
 140. Practice Comm.  of the Soc’y for Assisted Reprod.  Tech.  & the 
Practice Comm.  of the Am.  Soc’y for Reprod.  Med., supra note 105. 
 141. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 142. See, e.g., Peggy Orenstein, Looking for a Donor to Call Dad, N.Y.  
TIMES, June 18, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 28. 
 143. See Villarosa, supra note 25. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. 
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down his father after paying FamilyTreeDNA.com $289 for 
genetic matching services, it is not clear how long donor 
anonymity can be guaranteed anyway.146  Recognizing these 
problems, the United Kingdom has recently passed legislation 
enabling offspring who are eighteen years or older to contact 
gamete donors,147 and Australia’s National Health and Medical 
Research Council has adopted ethical guidelines mandating 
open donation.148  In the United States, similar requirements 
may well cause the price of sperm to rise, since fewer men are 
interested in being “known donors.”149  Given the desperation of 
many donor children to know their genetic origins, however, it 
seems a price well worth paying.150 
                                                          
 146. See Alison Motluk, Tracing Dad Online; One Teenager’s Detective 
Work has Shown that Promises of Anonymity for Sperm Donors may now be 
Worthless, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov.  5, 2005, at 6. 
 147. See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Disclosure of 
Donor Information) Regulations, 2004, S.I.   1511, Reg.  2, ¶ 3 (U.K.) 
(requiring that the Authority provide adult donor-conceived applicants with 
information as to the donor identity provided by donors to clinics after March 
31, 2005).  See generally Olga Craig, Where Have All the Donors Gone?, 
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Apr.  30, 2006, at 21 (describing a severe 
shortage of sperm donors in the U.K.  as a result of the new legislation 
eliminating donors’ anonymity); Mark Henderson, Sperm Donor Figures 
Rising Despite Loss of Anonymity, TIMES (London), May 4, 2007, at 32, 
(describing an increase in the number of sperm donors in the U.K.  since the 
passage of the new legislation); Making Babies: Will a New UK Law Stop 
People From Donating Eggs and Sperm?, NEW SCIENTIST, Mar.  12, 2005, at 3 
[hereinafter Making Babies] (discussing the potential chilling effect of the new 
legislation on gamete donation). 
 148. AUSTL.  HEALTH ETHICS COMM., NAT’L HEALTH & MED.  RES COUNCIL, 
ETHICAL GUIDELINES ON THE USE OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
IN CLINICAL PRACTICE AND RESEARCH 16 (2004), 
http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/publications/synopses/_files/e56.pdf (“Persons 
conceived using ART procedures are entitled to know their genetic parents.   
Clinics must not use donated gametes in reproduction procedures unless the 
donor has consented to the release of identifying information about himself or 
herself to the persons conceived using his or her gametes.”).   See generally 
June Carbone & Paige Gottheim, Markets, Subsidies, Regulation, and Trust: 
Building Ethical Understandings into the Market for Fertility Services, 9 J.  
GENDER RACE & JUST.  509, 538–42 (2006) (comparing Australian and U.S.  
fertility services laws and discussing a shortage in sperm donors in Australia 
since the enactment of open donation guidelines); Carly Crawford, Desperate 
Couples Buy Sperm Online, N.  TERRITORY NEWS (Australia), July 16, 2007, at 
7 (describing a trend of Australian couples buying sperm from anonymous 
online donors since the enactment of open donation guidelines); Barbie Dutter, 
Australian Sperm Donors Get Right to Contact Offspring, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH 
(London), July 2, 2006, at 31. 
 149. See Carbone & Gottheim, supra note 148, at 517; cf.  Craig, supra note 
147; Making Babies, supra note 147. 
 150. Cf.  Amy Harmon, supra note 11. 
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D.  TREAT ART AS A MEDICAL SERVICE COVERED BY INSURANCE 
Our final recommendation is the most complicated, since it 
involves engaging with the delicate and uncomfortable balance 
between the costs and benefits of assisted reproduction.   If we 
in the United States truly want to address the inequities 
described earlier, we could move closer to the European model, 
treating infertility as a medical condition and incorporating it 
into our health care system.  Such an inclusion would, 
admittedly, be expensive.  It would also, perhaps more 
critically, force us to define what kinds of fertility treatments 
make sense, just as we already define which cancer treatments 
or hip replacement surgeries make sense in any given case.151  
In practice, bringing insurance companies or other impersonal 
providers into the equation would force a distinction between 
cases of infertility, for example, between the twenty-seven-
year-old wife with blocked fallopian tubes, who would most 
likely qualify for several cycles of IVF treatment, and the single 
fifty-three-year old recovering cocaine addict and ex-felon, who 
would not.152  Moreover, insurance coverage could provide teeth 
to certain standards, mandating that coverage be provided only 
for clinics that report according to federal law or adhere strictly 
to professional guidelines.153  Coverage could also be structured 
to disallow or to provide disincentives for risky procedures such 
as multiple embryo transfer.154 
Most critically, bringing the admittedly harsh calculus of 
                                                          
 151. See supra notes 64–72 and accompanying text. 
 152. See supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text; see also Henne, supra 
note 23, at 104 (“In countries where ART services are included in national 
health care plans, the economic implications of the increased use of ART 
services make it imperative to determine which couples are likely to benefit 
from these services to judiciously allocate resources.”). 
 153. See CONN.  GEN.  STAT.  ANN.  § 38a–509(b)(6) (West 2007) (permitting 
insurance companies to require “infertility treatment or procedures be 
performed at facilities that conform to the standards and guidelines developed 
by the American Society of Reproductive Medicine or the Society of 
Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility.”); Haw.  Rev.  Stat.  § 431:10A-
116.5(a)(6) (Supp.  2007) (mandating coverage only for IVF procedures 
“performed at medical facilities that conform to the American College of 
Obstetric and Gynecology guidelines for in vitro fertilization clinics or to the 
American Society for Reproductive Medicine minimal standards for programs 
of in vitro fertilization.”). 
 154. See Meredith A.  Reynolds et al., Does Insurance Coverage Decrease 
the Risk for Multiple Births Associated with Assisted Reproductive 
Technology?, 80 FERTILITY & STERILITY 16, 17–21 (2003). 
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costs and benefits into the baby trade would allow us to launch 
a broader discussion about the societal impact of this trade.   It 
would encourage us to debate where and under what 
circumstances we, as a society, want to subsidize a person’s 
ability to procreate and where and under what (presumably 
very small) circumstances we do not.  It would also provide for 
us a means of bringing the interests of the child into a process 
that is now oddly parent-focused and to consider the public 
costs of a uniquely private endeavor. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Once we recognize that the baby business is, indeed, a 
business, it becomes easier to see where important policy 
choices are necessary and where the intimacy of private 
decisions must nevertheless leave room for the public policies 
that address the societal implications of those decisions.   In 
particular, assisted reproduction raises concerns related to the 
safety of women and children; to the identity of conceived 
children; to the equity with which various individuals have 
access to treatment, and thus to the potential to parent.   None 
of these concerns are, in actuality, particularly difficult to 
address through policy channels.  Safety risks, for example, can 
be mitigated by providing complete and mandatory information 
to all egg donors and IVF patients and by requiring better 
record keeping and follow-up studies of both women and 
children affected by assisted reproduction.  Identity issues 
could be easily (although perhaps somewhat more painfully) 
addressed by establishing donor registries and by allowing the 
adult children of donor conception to access information on 
their genetic parents.  Finally, even the intractable-sounding 
issue of equity could be addressed by providing insurance 
coverage for some well-defined set of fertility treatments and by 
incorporating the option of adoption into the equation as well. 
Like its more natural counterpart, assisted reproduction 
will always remain a private realm, marked by massively 
personal decisions and intimate, sometimes tragic results.  Yet 
the private nature of procreation does not rob it of its social 
implications or, in the case of assisted reproduction, of its 
decidedly commercial nature.  Accordingly, public policy in the 
United States needs to approach this new market with open 
eyes, recognizing it for what it is, and implementing regulation 
that allows it to evolve along the safest, kindest, and most 
beneficial path. 
